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MODERN reform in judicial procedure is characterized by extreme 
liberality in permitting parties to present in one action all the 
matters of legal controversy between them. Convenience for the 
parties, efficiency and economy in judicial administration are the ob-
jectives; and it is thought that they can best be attained by permitting 
great freedom of joinder to the parties and giving the court a large 
measure of discretion to order the trials in such a manner as to achieve 
efficiency and convenience consistent with just administration.1 The 
same objectives are, of course, sought also in the reform of federal 
practice. But the area within which they may be attained is not coin-
cident with that of the state courts. For, federal procedure must contend 
with the limitations on federal jurisdiction derived, not from notions as 
to e(ficient judicial administration, but rather from the theories and 
necessities of our federal form of government.:! The e.·dent to which 
a federal court may permit various claims to be presented in an action 
is determined, therefore, not merely by considerations of convenience 
but also by notions as to the proper functions of the federal courts and 
their relation to the courts of the states. 
The distribution of judicial powers between the states and nation 
is a problem in our federalism which only yesterday seemed to be politi-
cally as explosive as the division of legislative powers. Article m of 
the Constitution, and particularly the provisions empowering Congress 
to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Courts, were debated 
issues both in the convention to draft and the conventions to ratify the 
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Constitution.3 Number one bill of the first Senate under the Constitu-
tion was the First Judiciary Act of 1789, providing for the organization 
and jurisdiction of the federal judicial system.4 The parting effort of 
the Federalists before surrendering power to the Jeffersonian party was 
to enact the Judiciary Bill of 1801 as a bulwark against depredations by 
the latter.5 And among the first acts of the Jeffersonians upon assuming 
power was the demolition of the judicial fortress erected by the 
Federalists.6 
At frequent intervals thereafter the subject recurred for debate and 
action by Congress. At times the concern was with measures to enlarge 
or contract the federal jurisdiction with reference to that of the state 
courts. At other times attention centered on the functioning of the 
federal courts within their defined jurisdiction. 7 Not until 18 7 5 (except 
for the short lived act of 1801) were the federal courts given cognizance 
of that class of cases which now constitutes one of the primary sources 
of federal jurisdiction, cases arising under the Constitution, laws or 
treaties of the United States.8 And at no time has Congress granted to 
3. Article III, § 1: "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested In one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, 
ordain and establish." Article I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power •••• To constitute 
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court: ..•. " The opposition in the Constitutional Con-
vention to the creation of any inferior federal courts was met with the reply that In un-
foreseen emergencies inferior federal courts might be essential and that the proposal Wn!l 
merely to authorize their creation by Congress, not to require it. See 1 FARRAND, Tm: 
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION (1911) 125. This authority and the scope of 
jurisdiction conferred upon the national courts was spiritedly attacked in the state con-
ventions. 2 ELuor, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION (2d ed. 1866) 489 el seq. 
(Pa.); 3 id. at 521 et seq., and at 563 ('Va.); 4 id. at 136 et seq. (N. C.), See HAMitTON1 
THE FEDERALIST, No. 82. For a comprehensive discussion, see Friendly, The Historic Basis 
of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 483. With inferior courts absent, federal 
review could still be assured, of course, in the Supreme Court, although even that type of 
federal interference has had its share of opposition. See Warren, Legislative and J11dlclal 
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States (1913) 47 AN:.' L. REV. 1, 161; H. R. 
REP. (Committee Judiciary) No. 43, 21st Cong., 2d Sess. (1831), reprinted in 2 MooRE, 
WoRKs OF JAMES BuCHANAN (1908) 56, and in part in FRANXFURTER AND KATz, CAses ON 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931) 608, 
4. Act of September 24, 1789, 1 STAT. 73. 
5. Act of February 13, 1801, 2 STAT. 89. This act constructed a new hierarchy of 
federal courts, and conferred upon them almost the full scope of jurisdiction authorized 
by the Constitution. After specifying ~everal types of cases, it concluded with the omnibus 
clause "and also of all ... matters ... cognizable by the judicial authority of the United 
States, under and by virtue of the Constitution thereof, where the matter In dispute shall 
amount to four hundred dollars." Id. at 92. 
6. Act of March 8, 1802, 2 STAT. 132. The story of these two acts, as 11part and parcel 
of a fierce party strife" is told in FRANXFURTER AND LANDIS, TnE BUSINESS OF TilE SU• 
PREME CoURT (1928) 21 et seq.; 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES His-
TORY (Rev. ed. 1928) 185 et seq. 
7. Frankfurter, loc. cit. supra note 2. 
8. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470. 
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the federal courts the full measure of power which it was authorized 
to grant, in its discretion, by Article III of the Constitution.0 
Despite several significant restrictions/0 the scope of federal juris-
diction today is largely that of 187 5. But attempts to revise it have been 
numerous. For many years, there has been a standing committee of 
· the American Bar Association instructed to guard federal jurisdiction 
against Congressional limitation.11 Just before the current depression 
concentrated all energies upon efforts to retrieve prosperity, the scope 
of the federal courts' authority was again a major legislative issue. The 
proposal of Senator Norris to remove from the cognizance of the federal 
courts cases based on diversity of citizenship,12 one of the grounds of 
jurisdiction most frequently employed since 1789, evoked in some legal 
and business circles, what might be termed consternation, were it not 
for the character of recent reactions to some New Deal measures.It1 
9. Some familiar limitations, not required by the Constitution, on the pre.~nt fcderol 
jurisdiction are: the $3,000 jurisdictional amount requirement [see Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. 
S. 263 (1934)]; the restriction of the removal privilege in diversity of citizenship ca£CS to 
the non-resident defendant only [(JUDICIAL CooE § 28, 28 U. S. C. A. § 71). Under the 
Act of 1875, both the plaintiff and the defendant had the removal privilege (see Frank-
furter, supra note 2, at 512 et seq.)] ; the requirement that the federal question appear in 
the plaintiff's cause of action as an element in its affirmative statement and not as a de-
fense or as a reply to a defense [see White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U. S. SOD (1930); 
American Well Works Co. v. Layne, 241 U. S. 257 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. 
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332 (1906); Tenn. v. Union 
and Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894)]. Even the Act of 1801 contained a jurl<dictional 
amount limitation. 2 STAT. 89, see supra, note 5. 
10. Infra, notes 16, 39; Frankfurter, supra note 2 at 509-515. 
11. The Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform. This Committee e:mmincs all 
bills before Congress relating to federal jurisdiction. In 1932 a dis..«ent was recorded to 
the Committee's uniform opposition to all measures restrictive of the federal juri£diction. 
Dean Charles E. Clark and Joseph F. O'Connell, then members of the Committee, refu::ed 
to sign a report opposing the Attorney General's Bill, infra note 14, preferring "to prc:::ent 
both sides without trying to maintain that there is only a single side.'' 57 A. B. A. REP. 
511 (1932). The 1934 resolution of the Association is typical: "Be it Re.solved, That the 
American Bar Association does hereby again announce and declare that it is oppo£ed to 
the enactment of any law which will divest or substantially abridge the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts in controversies arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States." 59 A. B. A. REP. 73 (1934). 
12. S. 3151 and SEN. REP. No. 626, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) ; "In 1922 Senator 
Norris advocated the abolition of all the lower federal courts, retaining only the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and in substantially every Congress since Senator Norris has 
introduced bills to abolish the federal courts under the Supreme Court of the United 
States and other bills for the abolition of the Federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of 
citizenship." From Report of Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform (1934) 59 
A. B. A. REP. at 488. 
13. See Hearings on S. 3151, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928), cited supra note 12. See :ilio 
Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 433; 
Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Betu:een Cili:ens of Different Stales 
Be Preserved? (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 499; Comment by Members of Chicago University Law 
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And it is probably only the preoccupation with pressing economic prob· 
lems that is responsible for the subsidence, doubtless temporary, of 
the agitation of this proposal.14 
It may be also this very same preoccupation with the paramount prob-
lems of economic maladjustment that presented the opportunity for the 
easy passage in 1934 of three more limited bills which had long been 
urged and consistently rebuffed: 15 The Johnson Bill, curtailing federal 
jurisdiction in state public utility rate cases, 10 the Federal Declaratory 
Judgment Bil1,17 and the bill giving to the Supreme Court power to 
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the federal district 
courts.18 These three enactments, passed with little notice during great 
excitement over other matters, illustrate the widely divergent problems 
with which federal judiciary legislation deals. The Johnson Act is 
surely not an attempt merely to reallocate judicial business. It is not 
the product of lawyers' concern and lawyers' skill to improve judicial 
administration. It is rather an attempt to readjust the relations between 
state and nation on a matter of high political and popular import. 
The Declaratory Judgment and Rules of Practice acts, on the other 
hand, are pri!Jlarily lawyers' attempts to improve judicial administra-
tion, to simplify and make more efficient the functioning of the courts in 
their appointed jurisdiction. But the paradox of law generally is also 
Faculty, Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-Pending Bills (1932) 31 Mxcu. L. Rr.v. 
59; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Co11rts (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 
499. 
14. For a discussion of some efforts at major restrictions prior to the Norris Bill, sec 
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra, note 6 at 89 et seq., 136 et seq, Arter the Norrls 
Bill was introduced, a more limited restriction ~f diversity jurisdiction, [i.e. forclgn 
corporation doing business within a state and controversies arising out of that business] 
was proposed in The Attorney General's Bill, so called because it had the support of 
Attorney-General Mitchell and President Hoover. SENATE BILL No. 937, 72 Cong. 1st Scss., 
H. R. REP. 16344 (1931). 
15. See Jaffin, Federal Proced11ral Revision (1935) 21 VA. L. REV. 504; Doble, Rrcc11t 
Developments in Federal Proced11re (1935) 21 VA. L. REV. 876. 
16. 48 STAT. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41, amending § 24 of the Judicial Code. The bill pro· 
vides that federal courts shall have no jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the orders of 
state or local administrative bodies concerning public utility· rates, if such orders do not 
interfere with interstate commerce and are made after reasonable notice and hearing and 
the state courts afford a speedy and efficient remedy. For a discussion of this act and a 
collection of many similar bills which had previously been introduced but failed of enact-
ment, see Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 119, 125. 
17. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U.S. C. A. § 400. See BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS (1934) 
244 et seq., 271 et seq., 629 et seq.; Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgme11ts Act (1934) 
21 VA. L. REV. 35. 
18. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 723b, 723c. See Clark and Moore, A New Federal 
Civil Procedure (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387, 1291; Sunderland, The Gra11t of Rule-Maki11g 
Power to the Supreme Court of tlle United States (1934) 32 Mxcn. L. REv. 1116; J, A. 
Wickes, Tlle New Rtde-Making Power of tlle United States Supreme Court (1934) 13 
TExAs L. REV. 1. 
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found here. Marching with the declaratory judgment, and laying on 
- a restraining hand, is the fear of undue impediment to the freedom, the 
initiative, the discretion, or the functions of the executive and adminis-
trative branches of government.19 And alongside the rules of practice, 
interfering perhaps with the attainment of the theoretical maximum of 
efficiency in judicial administration, marches the caution against mal-
distribution of judicial powers between the courts of the states and the 
nation, against injuring by such distribution "the happy relation of 
states to nation" upon which federalism is built. 
The attainment of a proper distribution of judicial power between 
states and nation has been a concern of the federal courts no less than 
of Congress. On a smaller scale than in the case of legislation, but just 
as surely, judgment on jurisdictional problems in individual cases is 
influenced by an."'rieties about that distribution.=0 And the task requires 
statesmanship of a similar order. 
FEDERAL AND NoN-FEDERAL LAw IN PLAINTIFF's AcTION-JOINDER 
OF ACTIONS 
A vast aniount of legal scholarship has been e.'q)ended on attempts to 
define a generalized concept of "cause of action.m1 Apparently, the 
search has been vain,-or rather, succe?sful in establishing that "a 'cause 
of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different 
for another.1122 For the purpose of determining the extent to which a 
plaintiff may join in a single action in a court of general jurisdiction 
multiple claims that he may have against the defendant, rules as to 
causes of action are quite plainly marks or survivals of an over-technical, 
mechanical law. Orderly, understandable pleading and efficient trial 
without undue complication would seem to be the only pertinent de-
siderata. And these seem most easily attainable by absolute freedom of 
19. Compare the action of Congress in the Revenue Act of 1935, Punuc Ar:r No. 407, 
74th Cong., Aug. 30, 1935, § 405 of which amended the Declaratory Judsmcnt Act by 
adding the phrase "(e."o;:cept with respect to federal ta.-:es)"; 28 U. S. C. A. § 400, as 
amended. 
20. It may be preferable to Eay that the interpretation of the statutes in individual ca£es 
is influenced by the known Congressional an.'rleties about that distribution. See, e.g., Healy 
v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 (1934); Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25 (1934); Pusey & Jones Co. v. 
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923). And see note (1934) 43 Y.w: L. J. 1325. 
21. See Cr.ARx, Coo& PLEADING (1928) 75 et seq.; Clark, Tlze Cocle Cause of Action 
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 1291; McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions (1925) 34 Y,u.E L. J. 
614; :McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action But What Procedure for tlze Fecleral Courts 
(1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 415; Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definilion" of t!Jc "Cause of Aclior.'l 
(1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 129; Clark, Tlze Cause of Action (1934) id. at 354; Ga-.it, 
The Cause of Action, a Reply (1934) id. at 695. 
22. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67 (1933) ; Arnold, Tl:e 
Code "Cause of Action" Clarifted by United States Supreme Court (1933) 19 A. B. A. ]. 
215. 
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joinder of claims with a privilege in the parties to request, and a power 
in the court to grant, severance and separate trial of such matters as 
cannot conveniently be tried together. Even with respect to legal and 
equitable relief it would suffice to permit the parties to insist upon, and 
the court to grant, after joinder, the pertinent substantive rights as to 
trial and relief which the difference between law and equity involves. 
In any event, after a long experience with the limited joinder, the trend 
is now definitely in the direction of absolute freedom.23 
But a similar reform in federal procedure must take cognizance of the 
fact that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the Constitu-
tion, by Congressional enactment, by the necessities of our federalism. 
Where diversity of citizenship is the basis of jurisdiction, there is no 
obstacle to free joinder of claims24 since the citizenship of the parties 
remains the same whatever the claims involved in the litigation. But 
when the basis of jurisdiction is that the case arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States, it is the nature of the issues 
which is the prerequisite to power. The question is then not simply 
whether a joinder of the claims is expedient, but also whether the court 
has power to adjudicate the joined issues. In the federal courts the 
problem is not coincident, at least genetically, with that of joinder of 
actions in the state courts. In the latter, the question in the main is 
to what 'extent may a plaintiff join in one action claims based on entirely 
separate sets of operative facts. But in the federal courts that ques-
tion has been considered along with another, namely, to what extent 
may the court consider claims based on non-federal, rather than federal, 
law even with respect to a single set of operative facts. 
Recently the Supreme Court undertook to resolve a long-standing 
conflict on these issues. The case was of a type frequently recurring in 
the federal courts. Plaintiff and defendant were citizens of the same 
state. Plaintiff's grievance was that he had two versions of a single 
play, one version copyrighted and the other uncopyrighted; that he sub-
mitted both versions to defendant for production by him, if agreement 
could be reached; that instead of producing plaintiff's play, the de· 
fendant altered his ·own play by incorporating in it the chief features of 
plaintiff's play and then produced his own play so altered. The com-
plaint sought relief on three legal theories: ( 1) infringement of the 
copyright, (2) unfair competition with respect to the copyrighted ver-
sion, and ( 3) unfair competition and wrongful appropriation with respect 
23. See Clark and Moore, supra note 1 at 1320; cf. N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 258, 
added by L. 1935, 339: "The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint two or more causes 
of action whether they are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, pro-
vided that upon the application of any party, the court may in its discretion direct n 
severance of the action or separate trials whenever required in the interest of justice." 
24. Except possibly the jurisdictional amount requirement, discussed infra p. 409, 
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to the uncopyrighted version. The alleged wrongful conduct of the de-
fendant was, of course, the same under each of the theories. The 
District Court found that the copyright was not infringed and dismissed 
the other claims for want of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit, affirmed. On certiorari in the Supreme Court, Mr. 
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone also voted to affirm. But the 
majority of the Supreme Court held that there was error in the dismissal 
for want of jurisdiction of the second claim-unfair competition with 
respect to the copyrighted version-but no error in the dismissal of the 
third claim-unfair competition with respect to the uncopyrighted ver-
sion.25 As to the latter, the Court found it "hardly necessary to say that 
a federal court is without the judicial power to entertain a cause of 
action not within its jurisdiction, merely because that cause of action 
has mistakenly been joined in the complaint with another which is within 
its jurisdiction .... Since that claim did not rest upon any federal ground 
and was wholly independent of the claim of copyright infringement, 
the District Court was clearly right in dismissing it for want of 
jurisdiction."26 
The decision on the claim of unfair competition with respect to the 
copyrighted version was equally easy: 
"The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct 
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of 
which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and 
distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in 
character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly 
wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground 
be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon 
the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-federal 
cause of action. The case at bar falls within the first category. The bill 
alleges the violation of a single right; namely, the right to protection of 
the copyrighted play. And it is this violation which constitutes the cause 
of action. Indeed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition so 
precisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than the equivalent 
of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances."27 
Claim, right, ground, cause of action, even when duly emphasized by 
italics, do not, apparently, supply the true touchstone sought . .:;a Why 
25. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933). 
26. Id at 248. 
27. Id. at 246. 
28. The case is discussed in: Notes (1933) 33 Cor.. L. RE\•. 296, 699; 46 ltuw. L. lw;. 
1339; 32 MICH. L. REv. 412. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Van HooEcar, 72 F. (2d} 903 (C. C. A. 
9th, 1934), a carrier sued to recover $1,195.96 as freight charges on shipments allcscd to b;! 
subject to an interstate tariff. The defendant denied that the shipments were subject to the 
interstate tariff and admitted an indebtednCES of $593.70 under the intra£tatc tariff 
alleged by him to be applicable. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the intct"Etatc tariff 
was not applicable and that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter judsmcnt on the 
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was the "single right" taken to be the protection of the copyrighted play 
rather than the protection of the play? Why were not the claims of 
common law plagiarism and unfair competition but other grounds, in 
addition to the copyright, to support the single cause of action for viola· 
tion of the right to protection of the play? Suppose the case had in· 
volved a patent and the court had found the patent wholly invalid. 
Could the court still decide the claim of unfair competition on the 
ground that the bill alleged the violation of a single right, the right to 
protection of the patented device?29 But these may be captious ques· 
tions. The case presented a conflict between issues of political states· 
manship and issues of convenience and economy in judicial administra-
tion. The Court made a compromise adjustment. To the extent that 
it adjudicated the claim of unfair competition, the decision is obviously 
calculated to economize on the expense and time of litigants and on the 
expense and time of courts. The considerations which moved Justices 
Brandeis and Stone to dissent are not plainly visible. But we get a hint 
in another case. 
Argued on the same day as Hurn v. Oursler, and assumed to involve 
the same legal issue, was Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin,80 again a case 
of a recurring type. The plaintiffs sued a labor union and a number of 
individual defendants to enjoin a labor boycott which was alleged to be in 
violation of (a) the federal anti-trust acts and (b) the common law. 
The District Court granted an injunction apparently on the latter 
ground only. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit again, held 
that if the plaintiff's claim under the anti-trust acts raised a substantial 
federal question, it was to be decided on the merits against the plaintiff 
intrastate tariff, although no federal question remained in the case after the determination 
with respect to the interstate tariff was made. The opinion cites, and relics on, Ht~m v. 
Oursler. Circuit Judge Mack, who wrote. the opinion was also the trial judge In the 
Hurn case. In the Van Hoosear case, he makes the following interesting statement: 
"This principle [that the existence of a substantial federal question gave the federal court 
'the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal 
questions adversely to the party raising them'] has been most recently reinterpreted In 
Hurn v. Oursler . .•. The writer of this opinion, sitting in New York as the trial jud~;o 
in that case, found that the copyright had not been infringed, and on the binding au• 
thority of earlier cases in the Second Circuit, contrary to some cases in which tho writer 
had participated in other circuits, held that there was no jurisdiction to consider the 
charge of unfair competition. This was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals In a 
memorandum opinion citing its earlier cases, 61 F. (2d) 1031. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that there was jurisdiction on the principle of the Siler Case, 213 U. S. 175 
(1909), to consider the matter of unfair competition, but held that the bill in that aspect 
too, should be dismissed upon the merits .... We must look to analogies for guidance, 
since the Oursler case seems to be the first in which the Supreme Court has applied tho 
cause of action test to this jurisdictional problem." 
29. Lower federal courts have quite uniformly held against jurisdiction; infra, p. 406. 
30. 289 u. s. 103 (1933). 
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and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim 
under the common law unless there was diversity of citizenship 
between the parties. Finding that diversity of citizenship did not 
affirmatively appear, the court reversed the decree with leave to 
the lower court to grant leave to the plaintiffs to amend so as to 
make the requisite diversity. The plaintiffs' contention that, since 
the court acquired jurisdiction by the assertion of a substantial federal 
claim, it had power also to pass on the non-federal claim was eA-pressly 
rejected.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "limited to the ques-
tion of federal jurisdiction other than questions relating to diversity of 
citizenship,"32 but it refused to decide the issue as it was posed by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals and by the petitioner. In an unanimous 
opinion, the Court held that the claim under the anti-trust acts was not 
sufficiently substantial to invoke federal jurisdiction. It therefore af-
firmed the decision against the plaintiffs, but on a new ground which the 
Circuit Court of Appeals had assumed in favor of the plaintiffs. Since 
jurisdiction was thus not acquired on the federal question basis, it was 
unnecessary to decide the issue raised by the petition for certiorari, that 
is, whether the District Court would have had power to decide the com-
mon law claim if the claim under the anti-trust acts had been substantial 
and had been decided against the plaintiff on the merits.::m Were the 
two claims in this case but two distinct grounds in support of a single 
cause of action, or were they two separate and distinct causes of action? 
Had the Supreme Court answered the question in favor of federal 
jurisdiction, as in the Hum case, a countervailing policy and the basis of 
a dissent would have been readily discernible. The boycott alleged in 
the bill was probably legal under the decisions of the New York Court 
of Appeals.34 It was probably illegal under the decisions of the Supreme 
31. The opinion by Judge Swan is an e:~cellent and full disc~sion of the juri>dicUon:!l 
problems vJith respect to both diversity of citizenship and fedaral question. The pminent 
cases are ably analyzed and classified. Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932). 
32. 287 u. s. 590 (1932). 
33. The subsequent judicial history of this ca..<:.e is interesting. The District Court par-
mitted an amendment to correct the lack of diversity by striking from the bill a numbar 
of defendants and then ordered an injunction. The Circuit Court of App~ rcvcrE!!d be-
cause the relief granted was in violation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70-731 29 
U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1932), infra, note 39, limiting jumdiction of United States courts 
to issue injunctions in labor disputes. This Act had been p:J.SScd by Consrc:s after the i3-
suance of the original injunction [see In re Starrett, 45 F. {2d) 399 (S, D. N. Y. 1930)], 
but before the Circuit Court of Appeals decision. Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 
71 F. {2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 {1934). 
34. Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 11 124 N. E. 97 (1919); &change 
Bakery and Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1926); Intcrboroush 
Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928). It app~mS from the 
Brief for the Respondents in the Supreme Court in the Morrin case that the plain till's had 
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Court35 exercising an independent judgment on matters of common law 
pursuant to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.36 In the Hurn case there 
brought their action first ih a New York State court where a preliminary injunction Wrul 
denied. Thereupon, "the identical bill, in substance, was filed in the Southern District 
of New York." Brief, p. 11. 
35. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. 
v. Stonecutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927). 
36. 41 U. S. 1 (1842). It is difficult to prove the effects of this doctrine, that the 
federal courts are free, except on appeal from state courts, to find what the state law Is 
in matters of "commercial law" or "general jurisprudence" independently of, and contrary 
to, the courts of the state. That it is an incessant source of argument and friction Is 
attested by the extensive and growing literature centering on it, the legislative attempts 
made to recall it, and the divisions in the Supreme Court which it has evoked even In 
recent years. See FRANKFURTER AND KATZ, CASES ON FEDERAL ]URISDicnON' AND PROCEDURE 
(1931) 158 n. 1; DOBIE, CASES ON FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1935) 405, n, 6, et seq.; S. 43331 
70th Cong. 1st Sess., 69 Cong. Rec. 7989, May 3, 1928; Black and White Taxicab & Trans· 
fer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928) and comments 
on that case by a Kentucky state judge, Dawson, Conflict of Decisions Between State at1d 
Federal Courts in Kentucky and the Remedy (1931) 20 KY. L. J. 3 and by Senator Logan 
of Kentucky, who was counsel in the case, in the Senate on February 9, 1934, 73d Cong. 
2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 2284. 
The objection is not simply to the anomalous theory of the law built on Swift v. Tyson 
or to the differences in the results reached in individual cases in state and federal courts. 
Modernistic distinctions between cases and even traditional legal technique" can reconcllo 
and harmonize a good deal that seems irreconcilable. See Yntema and Jaffin, Prelimitlary 
A1U1lysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 869, 881 n. 23. Of perhaps 
greater significance is the fact that attempts at reconciliation are deemed unnecessary, that 
state decisions are openly and expressly rejected as unauthoritative and that the freedom 
of the federal courts to differ with state decisions is expressly avowed and consciously 
exercised. It is the notoriety of the infidelity rather than the fact of infidelity that may 
be the more troublesome. Amendment of § 34 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. A. § 725) 
so as to include the decisions of state courts within the "laws of the several states" which 
must be "regarded as rules of decision in trials . . . in the courts of the United States 
in cases where they apply" may not insure actual fidelity but it will at least "preserve 
appearances." 
The defense of the law around Swift 11. Tyson has rested largely on its alleged tendency 
to produce uniformity of law throughout the country. See Beutel, Common Law Jt1dicial 
Technique and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Unfortunate Decisiotts (1934) 9 
TuL. L. REv. 64; cf. Fordham, Swift 11. Tyson and tile Construction of State Stat11trs. 
(1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 131. The argument assumes, of course, what may not be so, that 
uniformity of decisions throughout the country in "matters of general jurisprudence nnd 
commercial law" is desirable and worthy of strife to attain it. The argument assumes 
also that a measure of uniformity may be attained by this means. It is doubtful whether 
it will ever be possible to demonstrate to the man from Missouri that the law around 
Swift 11. Tyson does or does not tend to produce such uniformity. But it is beyond doubt 
that in many instances state courts have expressly refused to follow federal decisions just as 
federal courts have expressly refused to follow state decisions. See Notes (1930) 43 HARV. 
L. REV. 926; Frankfurter, supra note 2, at 529 n. 150. (Whether or not the rejected de~ 
cisions were apposite, cf. Yntema and Jaffin, supra, is beside the point. The fact of 
significance is that the court deemed them apposite and rejected them nevertheless.) The 
probability of uniformity is reduced, of course, by the lessened frequency of the Supreme 
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was no known conflict in the state and federal interpretations of the 
applicable state law. In the JJ!lorritz case, the conflict was obvious, well 
known and probably the basis for the preferment of the federal forum 
in that very litigation.37 The Hum case was a private, business dispute 
between two individuals. The class of litigation of which it is a type 
involves individual disputes of no great popular or political concern; in 
their adjustment convenience of the parties and economy of judicial 
administration are weighty considerations. The lJ:lo"itz. case involved a 
very serious labor dispute between well organized groups of employers 
and employees. The granting or denial of an injunction in such a case 
affects at one time a large number of persons who are directly involved 
and a still larger number of actively interested sympathizers indirectly 
involved. The issue is highly explosive, popularly and politically. 
Judicial interposition in such disputes always rouses high feeling, even 
when jurisdiction is undenied. The dangers of federal interference on 
entirely non-federal grounds are obviously serious. And their serious-
ness is immeasurably multiplied when the federal court's versions of the 
state law is contrary to that of the state courts. The fears here are not 
"imaginary horribles." Few activities of the federal courts in their long 
history have roused more resentment than their activities in labor dis-
putes.38 From few sources was their prestige and power more seriously 
threatened. And it was doubtless because of avoidable excess in en-
countering both the dangers just mentioned that the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act was passed to curtail federal jurisdiction in this special spbere.:.tr 
Perhaps the dissent in the Hum case had the JJ:lorrin case in mind and 
feared the effects of establishing a general precedent authorizing the 
federal courts to consider claims not based on federal law. Must the 
Court's participation in cases involving only matters of general, non-federal Jaw. Cf. Cole 
v. Penn. R. R., 43 F. (2d) 953, 956-7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). Moreover, the opinions of the 
Supreme Court itself display a variety of attitudes toward the Jaw around Strijt v. Tyson. 
While the result in a case is determined by the vote of at least five Justices, the form and 
content of the opinion is largely dependent upon the Justice who is designated to write it; 
and the comments in the opinions about the law around Su.ijt v. T~,'sor. are almo~t as 
different as the Justices who write them. Cf. with the Black and White Ta:'ticab caJ:e, 
supra, Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 328 (1934) and the note in (1935) 
44 YALE L. J. 1113; see also infra, note 58. Whatever may be the attitude to\':ard it, the 
law built on Swift v. Tyson colors most problems of federal jurLcdicUon and no examina-
tion of these problems or of federal jurisdiction generally can prop~ly fail to take it 
into account. 
37. See note 34 supra. 
38. WITIE, THE Go'\'ER.~~ IN LABoR DISP'!Jl'ES (1932) 111-133; Frankfurter and 
Greene, Congressional Prr.cer over tlze Labor Injunction (1931) 31 CoL. L. RI:v. 385; Nelles,. 
A Strike and Its LegaJ Consequences (1930) 40 YAJ.E L. J. 507; FM!aa-tmTER .h!m Gro:E!u:, 
THE LABOR lNJUNCl'ION (1930) 5, et seq.; 199, et seq. 
39. 47 SrAX. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115. See Note (1935) 45 Y.ux L. J. 372. 
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undecided question in the Morrin case be answered in favor of federal 
jurisdiction, particularly in view of the Hurn case? 
The fountain head for discussions of this issue is Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.40 The action 
was brought by the Bank to enjoin the Auditor of the State of Ohio from 
enforcing a prohibitive annual tax levied pursuant to a statute expressly 
directed against the Bank and declared unconstitutional in that action. 
The case was thus of the familiar type clearly within the present scope of 
federal cognizance. But the case was brought and decided before the 
Judiciary Act of 1875, at a time when the federal courts were not given 
jurisdiction generally in cases involving a federal question.41 The 
Act creating the Bank conferred on it, however, power '~to sue and be 
sued, . . . in all State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any 
Circuit Court of the United States."42 Objection to the jurisdiction of 
the Circuit Court in which the Bank sued was made on the grounds 
(a) that Congress did not grant the jurisdiction and (b) that Congress 
had no power to grant it. The contention on the second point was that 
some suits by the Bank might raise no questions of federal law and 
would therefore not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. 
In a few sentences Marshall announced the opinion of the Court that 
Congress did grant to the federal courts jurisdiction of suits by or against 
the Bank. In many more paragraphs he advanced the Court's reasons 
for finding the grant within Congressional competence under Article III 
of the Constitution, and uttered the oft repeated sentences: "We think, 
then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is 
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, 
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of 
that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved 
in it. . . . 43 On the opposite construction, the judicial power never can 
be extended to the whole case, as expressed by the Constitution, but to 
those parts of cases only which present the particular questions involv~ 
ing the construction of the Constitution or the law."44 
The opinion was an achievement characteristic of Marshall. If the 
Act did permit the Bank to sue in the courts of the United States, the 
specific case before the Court was clearly one arising under the Con-
stitution because the plaintiff invoked a constitutional right which was 
alleged to have been violated by the defendant. No more had to be 
decided to dispose of the actual case. But Marshall was apparently 
anxious to establish the validity of a grant of federal jurisdiction in any 
suits by or against the Bank on ordinary commercial transactions. This 
40. 22 u. s. 738 (1824). 
42. 3 STAT. 266, 269 (1816). 
44. Id. at 822. 
41. S1&pra, note 8. 
43. 22 u. s. 738, 823 (1824). 
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concern is easily understandable. The Government was interested as 
an owner in the Bank and the Bank was performing governmental ser-
vice. Moreover, the Bank was the object of great popular hatred and of 
measures of reprisal by many state legislatures. It was sadly in need of 
a federal haven for its litigation.45 The doctrinal channel leading to that 
haven was quite obvious, once discovered. Whatever the claim it made, 
a suit by the Bank raised a federal question; for in any suit, the capacity 
of the Bank to sue, its capacity to contract or to own property, was an 
issue to be decided or assumed in the Bank's favor. These ever-present 
federal questions were sufficient to sustain constitutionality, once it was 
decided that Congress did grant jurisdiction of that scope. They were 
sufficient to tinge any case by the Bank with federal color so as to enable 
a federal court to deal with all its "questions of fact or law." 
In the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases/a decided in 1885, the Court 
applied the doctrine to what may seem to be a similar situation abstractly, 
but certainly not practically. The suits were ordinary actions for per-
sonal injuries against a railroad incorporated under a federal act. The 
railroad was permitted to invoke federal jurisdiction, by removal, be-
cause, as in the Osbom, case, the federal act giving the railroad legal 
life and capacities was at the foundation of any suit by or against it. 
The railroad was owned privately. It was performing no governmental 
functions. There was no comparable need of a federal forum. The 
issue was not whether under the Constitution Congress was authorized 
to grant federal jurisdiction to a federal corporation by a special act 
which was taken to have granted it. The issue was, rather, whether in 
a general grant of federal jurisdiction, by the Act of 1875, in cases 
arising under the laws of the United States, Congress included the special 
case of litigation by federal corporations actually involving no disputed 
federal claim.47 The decision in these Cases in favor of federal jurisdic-
45. Similar need for the protection of federal agents and federal claims has several times 
led to special e.'rtensions by Congress of federal jurisdiction. See e.g. the "Fona: BILL" of 
1833, 4 STAT. 632, § 3 ; the CIVIL WAR RotovAL Acrs, FrumcrtmTER A:m LumiS, op. cit. 
supra note 6 at 61 et seq.; the PROHIBinON Acr, 41 STAT. 316 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A. § 45 
(1936) [see :M:aryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1927)]; and the prc.."Cllt provWons ,•,ith re-
spect to revenue officers, 39 STAT. 532 (1916), 28 U. S. C. A. § 76 (1926). 
46. 115 u. s. 1 (1885). 
47. Article ill of the Constitution e.'rtends federal jurLc:.diction to "all caECS ••• arhln~ 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made • • • under thcir 
authority." The Act of 1875 extended federal jurL<diction to "all suits ••• arhlns under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States or treaties made ••• under thcir authority!' 
18 STAT. 470. The substantial identity of the words docs not, of course, require, on that 
score alone, an identical interpretation. The differences in the functions of the two enact-
ments, in the circumstances surrounding their adoption and in their further provisions justify 
inquiry as to whether their meaning is different. Cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25 (1934); King 
Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U. S. 100 (1928); Ex parte Collins, 271 U.S. 565 (1928). 
The present grant of jurisdiction is: "Of all suits of a civil nature • • • brought by the 
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tion-a triumph of mechanical logic, rather than statesmanship as in the 
·Osborn case-diverted a large stream of non-federal litigation to the 
federal courts and excited strong local opposition.48 Thirty years later, 
Congress overturned the decision with respect to railroads49 and ten 
years thereafter, with respect to other federal corporations.M 
In the patent, trademark and copyright cases where claims of unfair 
-competition were joined with claims of infringement, the argument of 
the Osborn case is easily distinguished, not simply because in that case 
the federal question was at the foundation of any claim, but also because, 
in that case, but a single cause of action was involved on any definition 
of that term. But there was at least room for a reasonable difference of 
-opinion as to whether infringement and unfair competition constituted 
a single cause of action. It was, therefore, held quite commonly, prim 
to the Hurn case, that, absent diversity of citizenship, there was no 
jurisdiction of the claim of unfair competition unless it was pleaded 
merely as aggravation of the damage caused by the infringement.G1 
United States ... ; or, where the matter in controversy .•. arises under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or treaties made ..• under their authority." JuDICIAL Coor. 
§ 24, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41. It is quite obvious that the problems discussed in this nrtlclc 
;are not to be solved by logomachy. The Supreme Court's decision in the Httrn cnso hnd 
no more support in the words of the statute than the decisions of the lower courts. If it 
.is granted, as urged by Chief Justice Marshall, that the jurisdiction of a federal court must 
-extend to "a whole case" rather than to "parts of cases" or "to a single question" or 41!n-
'~;ulated point" in a case [Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U. S. 738, 822 (1824); cf. the 
scope of Supreme Court review of decisions of state courts: Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 
590 (1875); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 378-80 (1927); Missouri ex rei. Wabash 
Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 273 U. S. 126 (1927); Clark v. Williard, 294 U. 5. 211 
(1934) ], the question still remains: What and how much is "a whole case"? The question 
;is hardly a matter simply of docket numbers and titles. 
48. See 2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 6 at 68S et seq. 
49. 38 STAT. 804 (191S). 
SO. 43 STAT. 941 (192S), 28 U. S. C. A. 42 except where the United States owns more 
:than one half of the capital stock of the corporation. 
51. Taylor v. Bostick, 299 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. Jd, 1924); Detroit Showcase Co. v. 
Xanneer Mfg. Co., 2SO Fed. 234 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); K. W. Ignition Co. v. Temco Electric 
Motor Co., 243 Fed. 588 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); W. F. Burns Co. v. Automatic Recording 
:Safe Co., 241 Fed. 472 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); Schiebel Toy & Novelty Co. v. Clark, 217 
.Fed. 760 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Ludwigs v. Paysons Mfg. Co., 206 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 7th, 
1913); Diederich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., 19S Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1912) ; Hutchinson, Pierce & Co. v. Loewy, 163 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908); Bernstein v. 
Danwitz, 190 Fed. 604 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911); Mecky v. Grabowski, 177 Fed. 591 (C. 
'-C. E. D. Pa. 1910); T. B. Woods Sons Co. v. Valley Iron Works, 166 Fed. 770 (C. C. N. 
]). Pa. 1909); Cushman v. Fountain Pen Co., 164 Fed. 94 (C. C. Mass. 1908); King v. 
Inlander, 133 Fed. 416 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1902) ; Larrowe-Loisettc v. O'Lughlin, 88 Fed • 
.896 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1898); L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 8 F. Supp. 3S1 (S. D. N. Y. 
1934); Badger v. E. B. Badger and Sons Co., 288 Fed. 419 (D. Mass. 1923); Unit Const. 
•Co. v. Huskey Mfg. Co.; 241 Fed. 129 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1917); Burt v. Smith, 71 Fed. 160 
1(D. Colo. 1895). See Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 255 U. S. SO (1921); Standard Paint Co. 
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But another line of cases has been taken to be in conflict with this 
holding: suits in the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of state 
taxes or the orders of state administrative tribunals on the ground that 
the enforcement of the taxes or orders would violate some constitutional 
:guarantee. 52 In these cases, generally, and in the H11rn case, the doctrine 
announced in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.a3 has received ac-
ceptance; the doctrine that, in view of the substantial federal questions 
raised, the court has "the right to decide all the questions in the case, 
even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party 
raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the 
case on local or state questions only," as, for e."{ample, interpretations of 
the state statutes or constitutions.M In these situations, cautions against 
excessive federal interference combine with considerations of convenience 
and economy to support the practice. Conflict between state and federal 
interpretations of state law is, at least theoretically, not probable here 
because Swift v. Tyson is said not to apply to the interpretation of state 
statutes.55 And a decision adverse to the state action on federal grounds 
v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U. S. 446 (1910); A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. 
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U. S. 166 (1906); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. \'. Dlinoi3 
Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901). Compare Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F. (2d) 
"991 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) [making a basis for distinction, the validity or non-validity o£ the 
]Jatent]; Farmers Handy Wagon Co. v. Beaver Silo & Box Mfg. Co., 236 Fed. 731 (C. C. A. 
7th, 1916); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 190 Fed. 606 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 
1911); Onondaga Indiana Wigwam Co. v. Ka-Noo-No Indian l\lfg. Co., 182 Fed. 832 (C. 
C. N. D. N.Y. 1910). See also note in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 at 241, and Notes 
(1933), 33 CoL. L. REV. 296; (1926) 40 HARv. L. RE\•. 298. 
52. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393-4 (1932); Chicago G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 
266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482 (1922); Lincoln G:JS 
Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256 (1919) ; Louisville & W. R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 
.527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville and Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, SOS (1917); Ohio 
Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Louisville & Nailiville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. 
S. 298, 303 (1913); Doherty v. McAuliffe, 74 F. (2d) 800, 802 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935). 
53. 213 u. s. 175 (1909). 
54. Id. at 191. 
55. See Marine National Exchange Bank v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357 
(1934); Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 (1934); Fordham, Tlze Ftdual Courts 
.and the Construction of Uniform Stale Laws (1929) 7 N. C. L. REV. 423. In di\'crsity o£ 
-citizenship cases, the federal courts have at times refused to follow e\'en state decisions 
construing state statutes, in the line of cases beginning with Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 6S U. S. 
175 (1863}. But such departures have been sanctioned only for situations in ·which the 
·.state courts have changed a construction of statute that c."dsted (or is suppn~ed to ha\'e 
-existed) at the time of the transaction involved in the federal court. The freedom o£ the 
federal courts under the doctrine of this case is, in any event, much more limited than that 
-under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 (1924) ; 
:Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930); Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932) and Note (1933) 42 Y.w: L. J. 
779. Cf. Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 96-97 (1935), where, in 
.considering a state statute which had not yet been before the state courts, the Court faid: 
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is certainly more coercive and perhaps more irritating than a similar 
decision on state grounds which are subject to remedy by the state,l1° 
Moreover, interpretation of the state statute is a necessary prerequisite 
to a determination of whether there has been state action violative of 
federal law, and when made might as ·well be acted on.l17 
What, then, is the law? When diversity of citizenship exists, any 
claims may be joined and decided. Where a federal question is the sole 
ground of jurisdiction there are considerable limitations. If one does not 
flinch from talking of jurisdiction in terms of discretion, the limitations 
are in the wise discretion of the courts to be fixed in individual cases by 
the exercise of that statesmanship which is required of any arbiter of 
the relations of states to nation in a federal system.G8 In terms of the 
Hurn case, however, claims may be joined when they are but different 
phases of a single cause of action and not otherwise.ti0 How, then, is 
"Reinforcing this token is the contemporaneous interpretation of the statute by the tnx 
commissioner of the state, the administrative agent charged with its enforcement. Fawcus 
Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 378. We give to such construction 'respectful 
consideration,' although we have power to disregard it. United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 
760, 763; Fawcus Machine ·co. v. United States, supra. The complainant wns at Uberty 
to maintain a suit in the State courts, where the meaning of the statute could have been 
determined with finality. It chose to have recourse to the courts of the nation. ln 
such circumstances we are charged with a duty of independent judgment (Siler v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 194; Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 2381 243) 1 but in 
default of other tests, we lean to an agreement with the agents of the State." 
56. Cf. Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933): In a suit to enjoin a 
Kentucky tax on the ground that it violated both the state and the federal constitutions, 
the federal three-judge court did not decide the issue under the federal constitution, but 
granted an injunction on the ground that the tax violated the state constitution, although 
the state courts had not yet passed on the validity of the tax. The Supreme Court 
modified the injunction by providing that the state tax commissioner could apply to the 
court below for a dissolution of the injunction decree if the statute were subsequently sus-
tained under the state constitution by the state court. See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 669. 
57. See Levering and Garrigues v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115, 119 (C. C. A. 2d1 1932); 
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 95 (1935) But cf. Note (1933) 33 CoL. 
L. REv. 304. When a state statute is attacked as in the Glenn case, 290 U. S. 177 (1933), 
decision of the state ground is not a prerequisite to decision on the federal ground. But the 
Supreme Court's modification of the decree in the Glenn case and the attitude expressed in 
the Fox case, supra, are sufficient guards against undue interference by the federal courts. 
58. Cf. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 328, 339 (1934): "The summum jus 
of power, whatever it may be, will be subordinated at times to a benign and prudent 
comity. At least in cases of uncertainty we steer away from a collision between courts 
of state and nation when harmony can be attained without the sacrifice of ends of national 
importance." 
59. The similarity between the problem here discussed and the old problem with 
respect to the granting of legal relief in equity is quite apparent. See CLARI<1 ConE PLEADING 
(1928) 69-71; I CLARx, CAsES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1930), 547 et seq.; Clark, 
The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 1. The differences between the 
underlying considerations of policy in the two situations are, however, equally apparent. 
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the unanswered question in the JJforrin case to be answered? And in the 
absence of diversity of citizenship may a claim under federal law for 
personal injuries be joined in the alternative with a claim under state 
law for the same injury? Our predilection is for a denial of jurisdiction 
over the non-federal claims in both situations; in the first for reasons 
already given, in the second, because personal injury suits have little 
place in the federal courts and such a holding would tend to divert them 
to the state courts. 
The Hurn case may doubtless be made the basis for a contrary hold-
ing. But it does not at all require such a result. The singleness or 
independence of the several claims, which is made the measure of 
jurisdiction, is an issue posed for judgment in each case. But the 
measure is admittedly elastic. And, be it remembered, it is a measure 
supposedly determined by statute. It would be at least injudicious to 
suppose that the elasticity of the measure is not to be responsive to the 
pressures of considerations of politics with respect to the place of the 
federal courts in our federal system which are at the heart of the statute. 
While it may not be simply a matter of taste whether in particular situa-
tions jurisdiction over non-federal claims is to be asserted because of the 
singleness of the cause of action, or denied on the ground of separate 
causes of action, as in the Hum case, or on the ground of unsubstantial-
ness of the federal claim, as in the llforri1z. case, the concepts do involve 
taste and judgment and leave wide latitude for choice and discretion. 
Two subordinate problems may be mentioned. Assuming that the 
plaintiff has properly joined in one action two claims which are deemed 
to be separate causes of action, must the jurisdictional amount requisite 
to federal jurisdiction be satisfied with respect to each claim separately 
or may the claims be aggregated? Here no constitutional issue can be 
raised; for the Constitution provides no jurisdictional amount require-
ment. The issue is entirely one of statutory interpretation.cl) The de-
cisions have been that the amounts of the separate claims of a single 
plaintiff against a single defendant may be aggregated for purposes of 
jurisdiction, that the requirement refers to the total amount of the mat-
ters in controversy in the suit.01 
Assuming, again, a proper joinder of separate causes of action in one 
suit, must the venue requirements be satisfied with respect to each cause 
independently or is it suffiqent that the venue 'for one of the causes is 
proper? Again, the question involves only statutory interpretation.0:1 
60. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(1). The amount originally fi:~cd 'l':as at 
$500 exclusive of costs. 1 STAT. 78 (1789). As noted earlier, there has been agitation to 
again increase the amount, to $7500 or to $10,000. 
61. B. & 0. Southwestern R. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 94, 106 (1911); Kimel v. 
Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 71 F. (2d) 921, 924 and n. 6 (C. C. A. lOth, 1934); Yates v. 
Whycl Coke Co., 221 Fed. 603, 606 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915). 
62. Some of the principal venue statutes are: 43 STAT. 1264 (1925), 28 U.S. C. A. § 112 
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No case exactly in point has been found. But analogies to be discussed 
later point to the probability that the defendant is privileged to insist 
that the venue requirements for each cause be considered independently 
of the other. 63 
CouNTERCLAIMS 
As in the case of joinder of actions, long experience with a practice 
which limited the kind of matters that a defendant could plead by way 
of cross-claim against the plaintiff has resulted in a definite trend toward 
absolute freedom in the defendant to plead any claim that he may have 
against the plaintiff with power in the court to order separate trials of 
matters that cannot conveniently be tried together. Trial convenience 
and administrative efficiency, it is thought, are more easily attained by 
the latter practice.64 But, again, adoption of the newer practice in the 
federal courts encounters objections based on the limited nature of their 
jurisdiction, though Federal Equity Rule 30°5 is procedurally the most 
advanced of the various counterclaim rules. That rule provides ( 1) that 
the defendant must plead those claims that he may have against the 
plaintiff which arise "out of the transaction which is the subject matter 
of the suit" and ( 2) that he may plead any claim that he may have 
against the plaintiff which would be the subject of an independent bill 
in equity. Three questions, peculiar to the federal system will be con-
sidered: (a) Must the counterclaim be supported independently of the 
main action by the constitutional grounds of jurisdiction, federal ques-
tion or diversity of citizenship? (b) Must the counterclaim, independently 
[Diversity, Federal Question]; 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1151 116 [Suits of n 
local nature, property of a fixed character]; 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 109 
(1926) [patent cases]; 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U.S. C. A.§ 35 [copyright cases]; 38 STAT. 
731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 [anti-trust act]; 28 STAT. 280 (1894), 6 U. S. C. A. § 10 
[against surety company]. 
63. Compare Dobie, Venue in Civil Cases in the United States District C011rt (1925) 35 
YALE L. ]. 129; Dobie, Venue in the United States District Courts (1914) 2 VA. L. REV. 1; 
Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 1217; Foster, Place of 
Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment (1930) 44 HARV. L. REV. 
41; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non-Conveniens in Anglo American Law (1929) 29 Cor.. 
L. REV. 1. 
64. Clark and Moore, loc. cit. supra note 1; Blume, A Rational Theory for Joinder of 
Causes of Action and Defenses and for the Use of Counterclaims (1927) 26 Mxcn. L. REV. 
1; Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes WhiclJ Contain the Term "Subject of the Actiow," aml 
Which Relate to Joinder of Actions and Plaintiffs and to Counterclaims (1932-33) 18 Coror. 
L. Q. 20, 232. 
65. Uniform Equity Rules of 1912 as amended May 4, 1925, 268 U. S. 710; HoPKINS, 
FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed., 1933) 209. 
The Equity Rules of 1912 did not attempt by rule to settle or decide federal jurisdictional 
problems. It seems probable that the uniform rules for civil procedure which the United 
States Supreme Court has been authoriz;d to promulgate, supra note 18, likewise will not 
attempt to deal with federal jurisdictional limitations, the subject matter of this arUclc. 
HeinOnline  -- 45 Yale L. J. 411 1935-1936
1936] FEDERAL JURISDICTION 411 
of the main action, involve the statutory jurisdictional amount? (c) Does 
the plaintiff have any venue privilege with respect to the counterclaim? 
Venue. After considerable conflict in the decisions of the lower federal 
courts, 66 the Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff has no privilege 
of venue with respect to any counterclaim which his defendant is per-
mitted to plead under Rule 30.61 The stated ground is that the institu-
tion of suit by a plaintiff constitutes a waiver, imposed by law as a con-
dition of the suit, of the venue privilege that he would have had with 
·respect to any counterclaim had it been the subject of an original suit 
against him.68 With respect to venue, the plaintiff is thus in the same 
position in the federal court that he would occupy in a state court if he 
had brought his action there. He will not be encouraged, therefore, in 
cases of coordinate jurisdiction, to choose the federal court in order to 
avoid a counterclaim. 
Jurisdicti01t. 1. In the problem previously discussed, "cause of action" 
is the elastic measure by which the jurisdiction of the court is determined. 
In the case of counterclaims, the measure, equaly elastic, is "transac-
tion" and "subject matter." If the counterclaim arises "out of the 
transaction which is the subject matter" of the plaintiff's suit,C9 the 
jurisdiction over the suit is sufficient also for the counterclaim, so that 
the counterclaim may be pleaded even though, had it been prosecuted as 
an independent action, it would not have been cognizable in the federal 
courts.10 And in such a case, the court may retain the counterclaim and 
award affirmative relief to the defendant even though the plaintiff's 
claim is denied on the merits.11 
The issue as to constitutional grounds of jurisdiction12 arises only in 
66. Rhodes-Hochriem Mfg. Co. v. International Ticket Scale Corporation, 57 F. (2d) 
713 (D. Del. 1932); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Bruns.,.:ick-Balkc-Collendcr Co., 279 
Fed. 758 (D. DeL 1922) ; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Ignition Co., 247 Fed. 
200 (E. D. ~fich. 1917); United States ExpallSion Ball Co. v. H. G. Kronckc Hardware 
Co., 234 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916), Durabilt Steel Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F. 
(2d) 139 (N. D. Ohio 1927) ; Parker Pen Co. v. Re."l:. Mfg. Co., 11 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 
1926). 
67. General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U. S. 430 (1932), Note (1933) 
31 MICH. L. REv. 1185; Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932). 
68. At the present term of Court a similar decision was rendered with rCl:pect to a 
counterclaim against a creditor who filed a claim in a receivership proceeding. Alexander 
v. Hillman, 56 Sup. Ct. 204 {1935). But a plaintiff may insist on his privilege of venue 
with re..opect to a claim against him by an intervener. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen 
& Kluge, Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. 6 (1935). 
69. Equity Rule 30, 268 U. S. 710. 
70. Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926). 
71. Id. at 610. 
72. As distinguished from equity or admiralty jurisdiction or jurL<dictiolllll nmount. 
For e."l:ample, in The Kearney, 14 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926), it is intimated that a non-
maritime counterclaim may not be pleaded in an admiralty suit, ruthough they both ari£e 
out of the "same transaction and subject matter." 
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"federal question" cases. If jurisdiction in the plaintiff's action depends 
on diversity of citizenship, the issue does not arise because the citizen· 
ship is the same whether the suit or the counterclaim be regarded.78 But 
it is, of course, not necessarily true that when the plaintiff's action rests 
on a federal question, the counterclaim arising out of that transaction or 
subject matter also involves a federal question. The contrary was the 
case in Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange/4 where the rule as to counter· 
claims was enunciated by the Supreme Court. Federal jurisdiction in 
that case was invoked solely on the "federal question" ground. The 
plaintiff attacked as illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law an ar-
rangement between the New York Cotton Exchange and Western Union 
under which the plaintiff was refused ticker service for the quotations of 
the Exchange; and he prayed an injunction compelling the defendants to 
furnish the service. The defendants admitted the refusal to convey the 
quotations to the plaintiff and attempted to justify it. They also filed a 
counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff was "purloining or otherwise 
illegally obtaining" the quotations and asked that the plaintiff be en· 
joined from that practice. In the counterclaim no federal question was 
involved. The illegality of the plaintiff's conduct was rested entirely on 
"general law," the law of the state. The Court decided against the 
plaintiff on his claim and also enjoined the plaintiff as prayed in the 
counterclaim. The term "transaction which is the subject matter of the 
action" thus refers to the facts-the acts or occurrences-not to the law 
invoked. 
A question similar to that raised in Burn v. Oursler may, therefore, be 
asked here. Certain facts, a "transaction," when coupled with a legal 
theory involving federal law, give rise to a federal claim of which the 
court has jurisdiction. If, in the same case, a different legal theory not 
involving any federal law when coupled with approximately the same 
facts also gives rise to a claim for relief, may the court decide the latter 
claim, even after deciding adversely to the former? In one aspect the 
case here is even stronger against jurisdiction; for the two claims are 
here made by different parties, while in the Burn case they were made by 
the same party. In both cases the Court answers the question similarly; 
but while it attempts in the Burn case to support its answer with reasons, 
it assumes the answer in the Moore case and inquires only whether the 
"transaction" is the "same" in the claim and the counterclaim. In the 
course of the latter inquiry, however, the Court states that "the relief 
afforded by the dismissal of the bill is not complete without an injunction 
restraining appellant [plaintiff] from continuing to obtain by stealthy ap· 
propriation what the court held it could not have by judicial com· 
73. Except in the possible case of change of citizenship in the interval between tho 
complaint and the counterclaim. 
74. 270 u. s. 593 (1926). 
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pulsion.m5 Obviously the Court did not mean complete "relief, for the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff did not even seek to be thrown out; much less did 
he seek to be thrown out and also maimed. But if the Court meant 
complete "relief" to the defendant, the statement does not help in de-
termining whether the Court had power to grant the defendant any re-
lief. Dismissal of the plaintiff's bill is, of course, vernacularly a. relief 
to the defendant, but the Court could hardly have meant that. Likewise, 
the fact that Rule 30 requires the defendant to plead, on the pain of 
forfeiture, a counterclaim arising out of the transaction is of no aid in 
determining the question of jurisdiction. The Rule does not require, 
so it has been held, the pleading of such a counterclaim if it is of a. legal 
rather than an equitable character.70 It obviously does not, and cannot, 
require the pleading of a counterclaim of which the court does not have 
jurisdiction. But perhaps the transaction is a flask which is thrown 
into the court's lap by the institution of suit. Having possession of the 
flask, the court can quench the thirst of either (or in part both) of the 
litigants. The defendant is relieved when the plaintiff is denied a drink; 
the supply is still there. But his "relief" is not complete until he gets 
the drink. 
The reasons for the rule of the :Moore case, apart from considerations 
of convenience and efficiency, which presumably have nothing to do with 
the question of power, are apparently to be found in the adumbrations 
of ancillary or auxiliary jurisdiction, of the equity doctrine of complete 
relief and of the doctrine that a court which has acquired possession of 
property has, by that possession, jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against 
that property.77 If the rule unduly e.'l:tends opportunities for federal 
determination of non-federal law, the "transaction" concept is an ad-
justable vise by which they may be at least considerably contracted. 
It is implicit in the Moore case that if the plaintiff's action is dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction, the counterclaim must also be dismissed, at 
least if there is no jurisdictional basis for the counterclaim independent 
of the main action. But if an independent basis does exist, the counter-
claim may be retained and determined. The only objections to such 
retention would be lack of service of process on the plaintiff in the rOle 
of defendant and possibly improper venue. But both objections are lost 
by an appearance. The plaintiff's institution of suit constitutes a 
waiver of these objections where his suit is within the jurisdiction of the 
court; and there seems to be no reason for holding otherwise when 
75. !d. at 610. 
76. American ~fills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U. S. 360, 365 (1922); Stephens 
v. Howells Sales Co., 16 F. (2d) 805 (S. D. N.Y. 1926). But ::1. defendant setting up a 
legal cause of action as a counterclaim "waives" objections to the equitable jurisdiction and 
''waives" his right to a trial by jury. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., supra; 
Pierce v. Union Nat'l Bank, 33 F. (2d) 997 (N. D. Ohio 1929). 
77. Cases cited infra, notes 92, 93, 94. 
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jurisdiction is subsequently denied. The condition is attached to the 
plaintiff's acts; and these are the same in both situations. 
2. Having found that the counterclaim in the Moore case was one 
"arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit,'' 
the Court deemed it unnecessary to "consider the point that, under the 
second branch [of Rule 30 with reference to counterclaims not so 
arising] federal jurisdiction must appear, as was held in Cleveland 
Engineering Co. v. Galion D. M. Truck Co., 243 Fed. 405, 407.m8 
Whether this statement was meant to approve the holding of the Ett-
gineering case or leave the question open the Court has never explained. 
But lower federal courts have held in accord with the Engineering case.1D 
And there is persuasive analogy to support these holdings. The decisions 
that venue or personal jurisdiction objections to a counterclaim are lost 
as a consequence of the institution of suit80 seem to indicate that objection 
to jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is not a privilege of a party, 
is not so lost. Likewise, the holding in Hurn v. Oursler that, in the 
absence of diversity of citizenship, a federal court has no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a non-federal cause of action which is joined by the plaintiff 
with a separate federal cause of action seems to require a like holding, 
in the absence of diversity of citizenship, with respect to a non-federal 
counterclaim which is entirely independent of the transaction that is the 
subject matter of the main action. 
If the counterclaim seeks relief entirely independent of the success 
or failure of plaintiff's claim, as, for example, in the extreme case of a 
counterclaim to remove a cloud from title to real estate pleaded in an 
action for patent infringement, denial of jurisdiction over the counter-
claim when it is not supported by grounds independent of those in the 
main action seems to be satisfactory enough. Conscience would, per-
haps, not be disturbed in any case where the counterclaim seeks af-
firmative relief and jurisdiction is denied only with respect to so much 
of the counterclaim as goes beyond extinguishing or reducing the 
plaintiff's recovery. But if it is held that in an action for money, the 
78. 270 u. s. 593, 609 (1926}. 
79. Noma Electric Corp. v. Rainbow Electric Mfg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 229 (S. D. N. 
Y. 1928); Tennessee Products Corp. v. Warner, 39 F. (2d} 200 (D. Tenn. 1929); 
Frankart v. Metal Lamp Corp., 32 F. (2d) 920 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Electric Boat Co. v. 
Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 215 Fed. 377 (D. N. ]. 1914); and see Kaumagraph Co. v. 
General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). 
80. General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U. S. 430 (1932) 1 and Leman 
v. Krentler, Arnold Co., 284 U. S. 448 (1932). It is stated in Alexander v. Hillman, 56 
Sup. Ct. 204 (1935) at 210 that § 51 of the Judicial Code (venue) "applies only where 
a suit is 'brought • • • by any original process or proceeding.'" This could hardly have 
been meant to assert that the plaintiff has no venue privilege at all with respect to a 
counterclaim; for the General Electric and Leman cases as well as the Alexander Clll!c 
clearly indicate that there is a privilege which is in some cases lost by the plaintiff's conduct. 
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defendant may not set off against the plaintiff's claim a separate claim 
for money against the plaintiff, conscience may be troubled a little. Htmt 
v. Oursler is not altogether in point. There the plaintiff is at most only 
inconvenienced by being required to bring two actions instead of one. 
Here the defendant would not merely be inconvenienced in a like man-
ner, but would be ordered to pay out monies to the plaintiff which, 
otherwise, would constitute most effective security for his own claim 
against the plaintiff. Such a sacrifice may be required by the politics of 
federalism, enacted in statute or the Constitution. But its harshness may 
be alleviated. The remedy for equitable set-off might be afforded as an 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in some cases.81 And, perhaps, in any 
case, the court would have power to stay e.,.ecution of the plaintiff's 
judgment until the defendant's claim was adjudicated in a state court. 
With respect to a plaintiff's attempt to join several claims in his 
action, one's conscience can generally be appeased by the thought that 
the plaintiff is not required to sue in a federal court and may bring his 
action in a state court where the limitations discussed would not exist. 
Likewise, when the defendant is sued in a state court and removes the 
suit to the federal court, he, like a plaintiff, may with clear conscience 
be made to pay for his choice the penalties of a limited jurisdiction. But 
this solace is not available with respect to the claims of a defendant who 
is haled into the federal court; he has no choice. A wise discretion in 
the use of the suggested remedies, stay of e.,.ecution and equitable set-off, 
may be the means of reconciling the dictates of justice or conscience 
with the political expediency of limiting the federal jurisdiction.8:! 
Jurisdictional Amount. Assuming that a counterclaim satisfies the 
grounds of jurisdiction mentioned above, must it also, independently of 
the main action, involve the amount which would be required if the 
counterclaim were prosecuted as an original action? The silence of the 
courts on this point is probably the result of an unquestioned assumption 
that independent jurisdictional amount is not required. There are three 
81. See STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDF..."CE (12th ed. 1877) 681 et seq.; Cr.Anx, Coo<: 
PLEADING (1928} 438. 
82. Cf. United States v. The Thelka, 266 U. S. 328 (1924), where the iEsue related to 
the jurisdiction over a counterclaim against as sovereign pleaded in a suit brousbt by the-
sovereign. Circuit Judge Mack, in the trial court, said (286 Fed. 188, 192-3): "The 
right of counterclaim and set-off having been first introduced as a part of our procedur:U 
law, halting recognition is just beginning to be given to the fact that the right as between 
litigants is something more than a procedural convenience and is really a requirement of 
substantive justice. . . • If the right of set-off and counterclaim be resarded as a mere 
matter of procedure, there would seem to be no reason why :1 right against a ~ovcrcign 
state should be recognized by set-off or counterclaim, which could not be set up in an 
independent suit. On the other hand, if the right of !let-off or counterclaim is to be re-
garded as affecting the substantive relations between the litigants, the question presented 
assumes an entirely different aspect." 
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lines of analogy which seem to prove the correctness of that answer: 
First, while there has been some conflict in earlier cases, it is now gen-
erally held that when a plaintiff institutes an action in a federal court 
on a claim which involves less than the required jurisdictional amount, 
the defect is cured if the defendant pleads a counterclaim which does 
involve that amount.83 This is exactly the situation assumed in our 
question, except for the difference in the designation of the parties. 
Second, when a non-resident plaintiff sues a resident defendant in a 
state court on a claim which involves less than the jurisdictional amount 
requisite for federal jurisdiction and the defendant pleads a counter-
claim which does involve that amount, it has been held that the plaintiff, 
qua defendant to the counterclaim, may remove the whole suit.84 Here 
again we have the situation assumed in our question, except for the dif-
ference in the designation of the parties. Third, if the plaintiff joins in 
an original suit several separate causes of action, permissible under the 
joinder practice, the jurisdictional .amount requirement is satisfied if 
the aggregate of the claims equals that amount even though each individ-
ually does not.85 The common view in all these cases seems to be that 
the statutory jurisdictional amount requirement is satisfied if the total 
amount in controversy in all the matters as to which the court is other-
Wise empowered to grant relief is of the required size. 
The conclusion that the jurisdictional amount requirement is not ap· 
plicable to a counterclaim, otherwise within federal jurisdiction, is 
limited to the cases in which the plaintiff's claim is itself in all respects 
within federal jurisdiction. The merits of such a rule are obvious; and 
it has no serious demerits. Resort to the federal courts is not thereby 
encouraged. When the action is brought originally in the federal court, 
it is the plaintiff and not the defendant who makes the choice. It is 
true that a contrary rule would tend to discourage defendants from re· 
moving to the federal courts actions begun against them in state courts. 
But this tendency would be offset by the incentive thereby afforded to 
the plaintiff to initiate his suit in the federal court in order to avoid the 
counterclaim. The statutory jurisdictional amount requirement is in 
large part a rule to relieve the federal courts from undue pressure of 
litigation. It is not so closely associated with political considerations as 
83. Ginsberg v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) lllld 
cases cited. See Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp. 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926), And 
see Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court (1925) 38 HARv. L. 
REV. 733, 744. 
84. San Antonio Farms v. Shandy, 29 F. (2d) 579 (D. C. Kan. 1928); Pierce v. Des-
mond, 11 F. (2d) 327 (D. C. Minn. 1926) and cases cited. 
85. B. & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Urtited States, 220 U. S. 94 (1911); Kimmel v. Missouri 
State Life Ins. Co., 71 F. (2d) 921, 924 (C. C. A. lOth, 1934); Mass. Protective Ass'n v. 
Kittles, 2 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 5th 1924); Armstrong v. Ettlcsohn, 36 Fed. 209 (N. D. Ill. 
1888). 
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the questions of jurisdiction previously discussed. The statute may, 
therefore, be interpreted as not requiring a rule as to counterclaims which 
has little bearing on problems of federalism, which would not have any 
tendency to limit the business of the federal courts and which would be 
plainly harsh on parties defendant. 
But these considerations do not apply, with equal force at least, to 
cases in which neither the plaintiff's action nor the defendant's counter-
claim involves by itself the requisite jurisdictional amount. In such a 
case jurisdiction of the plaintiff's action, as well as of the counterclaim, 
is in question. It is commonly said that the amounts of the two may be 
added to make the jurisdictional amount. This rule obviously brings to 
the federal courts business which otherwise could not reach them. There 
are, therefore, some contrary holdings and some limitations upon the 
rule.ss 
THIRD PARTIES AND CROSS CLAIMS 
The preceding discussion has been concerned with claims between 
plaintiffs and defendants as originally aligned. There are more com-
plicated situations with multiple parties where there is a considerable 
scrambling in the alignment of their claims and where third persons may 
be sought to be introduced in the suits. But the problems raised in these 
situations and the lines of argument for their solution are similar to those 
previously considered. The further discussion may therefore be brief. 
A defendant may wish to present in the suit against him, one or more 
of a variety of claims other than a counterclaim against a plaintiff or 
plaintiffs alone. The defendant's claim may be: (1) against the plaintiff 
and a third person who is not yet a party to the action; (2) against one 
or more of his co-defendants; ( 3) against the plaintiff and a co-de-
fendant; ( 4) against a co-defendant and a third person; ( 5) against a 
third person alone. Obvious considerations of convenience impose some 
limits upon the freedom of a defendant to complicate a litigation by 
the introduction of such claims, though an enlightened procedure would 
hardly restrict that freedom beyond the limits of convenience and 
efficiency. Even in the absence of jurisdictional limitations, however, 
the procedure with reference to such claims is still in the developing 
stage. Third party impleader is in some aspects a modern innovation 
not yet generally adopted in state practice.87 In 1925 Equity Rule 30 
86. See Dobie, supra note 83; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 
1926). 
87. For more general discussions of third-party practice, £ee Bennett, Bringing in Tllird 
Parties by the Defendant (1935) 19 1\Il:NN. L. REv. 163; Gregory, Procedural Aspects of 
Securing Tort Contribution in the Inj!lTed Pklintijj's Action (1933) 47 ILmv. L. RI:v. 209; 
Gregory, Tort Contribution PractU;e in New York (1935) 20 Co::u;. L. Q. 269; Cohen, 
Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants' lUgllts Against Third Parties (1933) 33 Cor.. L. 
REv. 1147. 
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was amended to provide that when a third peJ:Son is necessary for the 
determination of a counterclaim against a plaintiff, the third person may 
be brought in if he is subject to the court's jurisdiction. Limited kinds 
of crossbills by a defendant against a co-defendant are traditionally per-
missible in equity practice.88 A liberal procedure with respect to all the 
.situations mentioned will probably soon develop. But there may be limits 
upon its scope, though not on its liberality, in the federal courts. 
1. Consider first the case of a third person sought to be joined with a 
plaintiff in a counterclaim. Where lack of federal question or diversity 
of citizenship is an objection available to the plaintiff if the claim is made 
against him alone, it is doubtless equally available to the third person. 
The defect is not cured by joining the third person. But, as previously 
pointed out, a plaintiff's objection on this score in some cases is overcome 
by a holding that the counterclaim arises out of the transaction which 
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's action. May the third person's 
objection be similarly met? In view of the practice which permits one 
of several joint obligors to be sued alone when jurisdiction cannot be 
acquired over the others,89 the defendant would not be completely re-
buffed if his counterclaim were confined to the plaintiff, but he would 
.suffer some inconvenience and relitigation would not be avoided. It 
would be desirable, therefore, to place the third person's objection on a 
par with the plaintiff's. Theory justifies this treatment. For the juris-
diction involved is not a privilege of the party to demand or forsake 
voluntarily or otherwise. Since the jurisdiction of the court over a 
counterclaim against the plaintiff is, therefore, not referable to the con-
duct or character of the plaintiff, but rather to its cognizance of the 
"transaction," there is no basis on which to differentiate between the 
·plaintiff and third persons interested in the transaction.00 
A different problem, however, is involved in the question of personal 
jurisdiction. In every real sense the third person is in the position of a 
defendant in a suit. He must be served with process or its equivalent 
in the same manner as a defendant and he must be subject to suit in the 
district in which the plaintiff's action is pending. These requirements 
are privileges given to persons against whom suit is brought. The 
plaintiff is not given these privileges with reference to a counterclaim 
.against him because it is reasonable to require him to litigate in the court 
in which he chose to institute his action against the defendant all the 
matters in controversy between them and not simply those which he 
88. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U. S. 130 (1854); Cross v. DeValle, 68 U. S. 5 (1863); 
R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 73 U. S. 748 (1867); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U. S. 807 
(1869). 
89. JUDICIAL CoDE§ 50,28 U.S. C. A.§ 111; Equity Rule 39; see Camp v. Grass, 2SO 
-u. s. 308 (1919). 
90. Cases cited infra, notes 92, 93, 94. 
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chooses to present. No such justification is available with reference to 
the third party who is summoned to defend a claim against him and who 
asks for the usual privileges of a defendant. 
l< While joining a third person with the plaintiff in a counterclaim against 
them does not cure a defect in jurisdiction which would have existed had 
the counterclaim been pleaded against the plaintiff alone, the joinder may 
cause a defect which otherwise would not have existed. If there is 
diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and defendant and the 
latter pleads a counterclaim entirely unrelated to the plaintiff's action, 
federal jurisdiction over the counterclaim nevertheless e.'W;ts. But sup-
pose that the defendant joins in the counterclaim a third person who is 
a citizen of the same state as the defendant, the counterclaim then does 
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements and both the plaintiff and the 
third person may raise the objection.01 r ·• 
2. Cross-claims between co-defendants are familiar in equity practice. 
Doubtless they have a place in law actions or in a procedure which unites 
law and equity. From the standpoint of convenience alone, there seems 
to be no reason for permitting such cross claims unless they bear some 
relation to the main action. If for some unknown reason, they should 
be permitted despite total irrelevance to the main action, they would 
properly be subject to all the jurisdictional requirements which would be 
applicable were they prosecuted as independent actions. 
In the old equity practice, cross-bills between co-defendants were per-
mitted when they related to property or funds within the court's posses-
sion,02 when they were "au.'riliary to the original suit and a graft and a 
dependency upon it,m3 when they were necessary to enable the court to 
grant "complete" relief and prevent its decree from effecting an "in-
justice.m4 With these guides for the determination of the scope of 
91. Cf. Olsen v. Jacklowitz, 74 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Dollir S. S. Lines , •• 
Merz. 68 F. (2d} 594 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); Devost v. Twin State Gas & El. Co., 250 Fed. 
349 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918). 
92. Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1887) [chattel); Morgan's Co. 
v. Te....as Central Ry., 137 U.S. 171 (1890) [realty); 1st Nat'l Bank v. S:ilcm Capital Flour 
Mills Co., 31 Fed. 580 (C. C. Ore. 1887); Park v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 70 Fed. li-11 
(C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1895). See Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic & P.R. Co., 70 Fed. SIS (C. 
C. Colo. 1895); Ulman v. Iaeger's Adm'r, 155 Fed. 1011 (C. C. S. D. W. Va. 1907); Re-
public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Mass. Bond & Ins. Co., 6S F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). 
But see Newton v. Gage, 155 Fed. 598 (C. C. S. D. CaL 1907). 
93. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U. S. 789 (1869) ; Federal M. & S. Co. v. Bunker Hill & 
S. !\fining & Concentrating Co., 187 Fed. 474 (C. C. Idaho 1909). See Stoncmctz 
Printers' Machinery Co. v. Brown Folding Machine Co., 46 Fed. 851 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1891). 
94. Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lu."t, 218 U. S. 258 (1910) ; Ames Realty 
Co. v. Big Indian !\fining Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C. C. Montana 1906); Craig v. Dorr, 145 
Fed. 307, (C. C. A. 4th, 1906); Barrett v. Mayes, 43 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. lOth, 1930). 
See Mathis v. Ligon, 39 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. lOth, 1930), cert. denied 282 U. S. 846 
(1930). 
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equity jurisdiction and procedure, questions as to the scope of federal 
jurisdiction were, as foreshadowed by the preceding discussion, auto· 
matically answered. The jurisdiction over the main bill gave jurisdiction 
over the dependent cross-claims.95 But in a more liberalized equity 
practice and in actions at law there develops a divergence between 
relevance for purposes of convenient procedure only and relevance for 
purposes of jurisdiction.96 Thus, in an action against two defendants on 
a joint liability to· the plaintiff, may one of the defendants plead against 
his co-defendant a claim for contribution or indemnity in the absence of 
diversity of citizenship between them and in the absence of any foundaM 
tion in federal law for the claim? It is unquestionably related to and in 
a manner dependent upon the main action. Is the relation or dependency 
close enough for federal jurisdiction?97 
3. When a defendant seeks to join his co-defendant with a third person 
in a claim against them, the situation is analogous to that in which the 
third person is joined with the plaintiff in a counterclaim. If, despite the 
lack of independent jurisdictional support for the cross-claim, the reM 
lationship between it and the main action is sufficiently close to warrant 
its assertion against the co-defendent alone, it may also be asserted 
against the third person, subject, however, to the personal privileges of 
service and venue which the third person enjoys in common with other 
defendants. If, on the other hand, the cross-claim against the co-deM 
fei].dant alone would require independent jurisdictional support, it reM 
quires such support also when the third person is joined; and, as in the 
case of counterclaims, the joinder may defeat jurisdiction.98 
The increasing number of states which require contribution between 
tortfeasors and the general development of third party practice00 has 
increased these jurisdictional problems. In the small number of reported 
95. Because the defendants against whom cross-claims were filed were already parties 
to the action and the cross-claims were ex hypothesi dependent upon the action, no venue 
problems were raised. Compare the different situation of a third party sought to be 
joined, supra, p. 418. 
96. See Magnolia Petroleum Products Co. v. Suits, 40 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 10th, 
1930): A gave an oil and gas lease on his land to P. Later, A executed a conveyance 
of the fee in part of that -land to D for church purposes, to be terminated when the land 
ceased to be used for church purposes, and subject to a clause prohibiting D from drllllng 
for oil and gas. D then made an oil and gas lease to S who thereafter drllled for oll, 
P sued to enjoin the drilling and made parties defendant S, D and A. A filed a cross·blll 
against S and D asking that his title to the land, subject to P's lease, be quieted and that he 
recover a judgment against S and D for the royalties on the oil produced by them from 
the premises. The court granted P's prayers but dismissed the cross-claim for want of 
jurisdiction because A, S and D were citizens of the same state. 
97. Cf. Prince v. Childs Co., 23 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Craig v. Dorr, 145 
Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 4th, 1906); and see cases cited infra note 100. 
98. Supra, p. 419. 
99. See Bennett, Gregory, and Cohen, all supra, note 87. 
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cases that have thus far dealt with the impleader of third persons to 
answer a claim of indemnity or contribution by a defendant, it has been 
uniformly held that the impleader 'is not available unless grounds for 
jurisdiction, independent of the main action, support the claim against 
the third person.100 Such holdings obviously sacrifice a good deal of 
convenience and economy. In view of the close connection between the 
impleader claim and the main action, it probably may not be said that 
the Constitution requires the sacrifice. But in view also of the many 
subtle considerations of governmental policy involved, it may be wise to 
await a legislative determination. 
We have not exhausted the brain-twisting combinations and permuta-
tions of the situations which we have discussed. And we have left some 
related situations untouched: interpleader,101 intervention, the joinder 
and substitution of parties/02 and the effect of failure to raise objections 
to the jurisdiction over the subject matter.103 But we have indicated 
the nature of the problems, the dialectics they evoke and the deeper con-
siderations of policy involved. Specific rules for special types of cases 
may be stated, with perhaps few qualifications; but generalization can 
be made only in terms of conflicting interests and differing values. 
100. Wilson v. United American Lines, 21 F. (2d) 872 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Sperry v. 
Keeler Transportation Lines, 28 F. (2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1928); Lowry & Co. v. Nat'l City 
Bank of N. Y., 28 F. {2d) 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1928); Franklin v. Meredith Co., 63 F. 
(2d) 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Osthaus v. Button, 70 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934). 
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Hall, 70 F. (2d) 60S (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); 
Grobe! v. Miller, 71 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934). Whether an i=sue impleaded in a 
suit begun in a state court "would be removable at all, either as a separable controversy 
taking the whole suit into the Federal court, or as a separate one, taking only the cro~s­
action" was questioned but not decided in City of Waco, Te.w.s v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 76 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). For the earlier phases of this C~£e, EW 293 
U. S. 140 (1934) and 67 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). 
101. See Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Repub-
lic National Bank & Trust Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 6S F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 5th, 
1934); Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, 8 F. Supp. 870 (N. D. Okla. 1934); Note (1935) 48 
HARv. L. REv. 854; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v .Cross, 7 F. Supp. 130 (S. D. N.Y. 1934); Chaffee, 
Interpleader in tlze United States Courts (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1134. 
102. Salem Co. v. Manufacturers Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924) ; Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 
U. S. 627 (1927); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112 (1893); Hawes v. First National 
Bank, 229 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Hadden v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 34 F. (2d) 580 
(D. Idaho 1929); Cohen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 4 F. (2d) 564 (E. D. S. C. 1925); 
Clark and Moore, supra note 1 at 1317 et seq. 
103. Cf. JUDICIAL ConE § 37 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 80. 
